Allowing Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike Russia strengthens an ally but risks crossing an unknown red line.
Since the war in Ukraine began over two years ago, US and Western military support has followed a pattern.
First, Kyiv requests a specific weapons system or capability. Washington initially declines, fearing escalation with Russia. Putin then issues vague nuclear threats. Ukraine's supporters spend months advocating in the media. Eventually, one or more European allies agree to provide the requested arms, and finally, the US follows suit.
This pattern played out with battle tanks, Patriot air defense systems, F-16 fighter jets, and long-range ATACMS. The latest shift came last Thursday when the Biden administration, for the first time, allowed Ukraine to use American-supplied weapons to strike targets inside Russian territory. Soon after, there were unconfirmed reports of Ukraine doing so. Ukraine has long sought this capability, and the discussion gained urgency as Russia launched a major offensive in the northern Kharkiv region, steadily gaining ground.
Much of the fighting occurs near the Russian border, with the Russian military using highly destructive “glide bombs” from the safety of Russian airspace to devastate Ukrainian cities. Ukrainian officials and their Western advocates argued that prohibiting strikes within Russia gave Russia a “safe space” to launch its attacks.
However, allowing Ukraine to strike Russian territory with Western weapons — rather than its own drones and missiles — marks a significant escalation from a US administration that has consistently stated its military aid is solely for defending Ukraine's territory, not attacking Russia.
Despite repeatedly defying Putin's warnings over the past two years without provoking major retaliation, the question remains: Is the Russian leader bluffing with his apocalyptic threats, or are we at risk of crossing a point of no return?
Taking the gloves off
Russia's latest offensive in Kharkiv began in early May, retaking ground lost during a Ukrainian counteroffensive in September 2022 and forcing Ukrainian troops to retreat from several towns. Kharkiv, Ukraine's second largest city, has come under heavy bombardment due to a shortage of air defense ammunition, resulting in severe civilian casualties.
Kharkiv's vulnerability is largely due to its proximity to the Russian border, giving Moscow a significant advantage. As the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted, "The Russian Air Force can strike wide swaths of Ukraine uninhibited so long as it leverages Russia’s airspace sanctuary. The Russian Air Force can strike no fewer than 869 settlements in Kharkiv Oblast without ever leaving Russian airspace.”
Few analysts believe Russia can take Kharkiv in the foreseeable future, but the offensive is straining Ukrainian defenses, making the restrictions on Ukraine's ability to retaliate harder to justify.
The first sign of change came in early May when British Foreign Secretary David Cameron stated that Ukraine should decide how to use British-supplied weapons, including long-range “Storm Shadow” missiles, to strike inside Russia. French President Emmanuel Macron, whose military also supplies Ukraine with long-range missiles, made a similar statement.
By the end of that week, nearly all of Ukraine’s major European allies, along with the NATO Secretary General, had expressed no issue with Ukraine using their weapons to strike Russia.
Finally, the US shifted its stance, announcing that it would allow American-supplied weapons systems to be used for “counter-fire purposes in the Kharkiv region so Ukraine can hit back against Russian forces attacking or preparing to attack them.” This is significant because the US is not only Ukraine’s largest weapons supplier but also provides the specific weapons Ukraine needs.
In particular, Ukraine can now target Russian forces across the border with HIMARS — a US-supplied rocket launcher that has been devastating against Russian ammunition depots and staging areas within Ukraine since its introduction in summer 2022. On Monday, the ISW assessed that Ukraine likely used HIMARS to hit a Russian air defense system in Russia’s Belgorod province after the policy change. The Ukrainian government has not confirmed the strike, which was reported in the Russian press.
What difference will this make? Franz-Stefan Gady, a military analyst with the Center for a New American Security, said it’s “important that the Ukrainians are allowed to strike across the border” and that the previous policy “enabled the Russians to move some of their staging areas and supply depots closer to the border.”
However, he also cautioned that the switch is unlikely to be decisive as the Russians have been adapting to long-range precision strikes since HIMARS first arrived in Ukraine, using new tactics and improved electronic warfare systems.
Still, Kyiv will take any edge it can get. “Honestly, it’s lifesaving for Ukrainians,” Oleksandra Ustinova, a Ukrainian MP who monitors arms supplies, told Vox. “We literally couldn’t protect our people and fire back as a self-defense measure.”
Russia’s war comes home
US officials stress that this is not a blank check, and Ukraine is authorized to use American weapons only to respond to imminent threats just across the border, not to strike deep within Russia. (HIMARS can fire guided rockets with a range of about 40 miles and ATACMS, which can travel up to 200 miles.)
Ukraine has been launching strikes at targets inside Russia, such as ammunition depots and fuel refineries, since April 2022, but nearly always with its own weapons, mainly drones. In May 2023, a drone — likely Ukrainian — even flew over the Kremlin. Ukrainian officials rarely directly claim responsibility for these strikes.
Officially, the US does not support these strikes, and concerns about them were one reason why the US was reluctant to send Ukraine long-range ATACMS. (The US policy does not apply to Crimea, which Washington considers occupied Ukrainian territory and thus fair game.)
These limits have caused friction in the US-Ukraine relationship, highlighting the limits of American support when it conflicts with US interests. In recent months, the US has urged Ukraine to stop attacks on Russian oil refineries, fearing it could drive up global oil prices. US officials have also expressed concerns about Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian nuclear early-warning radar systems, arguing that these systems had little to do with Russia’s military activities in Ukraine and could dangerously unsettle Moscow.
Despite a commitment to Ukraine’s defense — with total aid and assistance now almost $175 billion — the US has often prioritized avoiding a larger conflict.
Nuclear threats
Putin responded to these developments with vague but concerning references to Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the largest in the world.
“Constant escalation can lead to serious consequences,” Putin told reporters in Uzbekistan last week, just before the US decision. “If these serious consequences occur in Europe, how will the United States behave, bearing in mind our parity in the field of strategic weapons?” A week earlier, the Russian military conducted drills simulating the use of a tactical nuclear weapon near Ukraine.
Such statements and actions have become common. On the first day of the war, Putin warned: “Whoever tries to hinder us, or threaten our country or our people, should know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead to consequences you have never faced in your history.” Other Russian officials have been even less vague.
But more than two years into the war, these threats' credibility is waning. For Ukrainians, Putin’s lack of follow-through shows that the West shouldn’t be constrained by them.
“I’ve been hearing about nuclear escalation since the first day,” Ustinova told Vox. “First it was, ‘if Ukraine gets MIGs from Poland, he’ll use nukes.’ Then it was HIMARS, then Patriots, then tanks. He’s just a bully.”
In Washington, however, Biden and top officials have repeatedly invoked the prospect of a “third world war” to explain why they are not simply giving Ukraine every weapon they ask for.
Jon Wolfsthal, the director of global risk at the Federation of American Scientists, who advised then-Vice President Biden on nuclear issues during the Obama administration, described Biden as having “more experience with nuclear deterrence and nuclear risk than any president who's ever been in the oval office. He has internalized these risks and is mindful not to overreact or take on more risk than the situation merits.”
The difficulty of this debate is that it’s impossible to prove a negative. Does Putin’s restraint show Biden was prudent, or too timid?
The slow build
US assistance to Ukraine evolves in response to battlefield conditions. In the war's early days, Ukraine's priorities were shoulder-mounted anti-tank weapons like Javelins and Stingers to destroy Russia’s invading tanks. Later, Ukraine needed significant numbers of Western tanks as its pre-war stock was depleted.
But clearly, escalation management is also at work. Call it salami slicing or boiling the frog: Defenders of the Biden administration argue that it has avoided nuclear escalation by gradually increasing support for Ukraine, rather than provoking Putin by going all in at once.
This is understandably frustrating for Ukrainians, who face an existential threat. “It’s like we’re running behind the train,” said Ustinova. “Every time we ask for something, we get it months or a year later when it won’t make as much of a difference as it would have before.”
Some US lawmakers increasingly agree. Last week, Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called for the administration to “abandon its ‘drip-drip-drip’ policies and embrace my mantra of ‘more, better, and faster’ to arming Ukraine.” (Wicker’s statement did not mention the nearly half-year delay in aid to Ukraine caused by opposition from House Republicans.)
For now, however, the drip-drip approach seems likely to continue. The next priorities, Ustinova said, will be training more pilots for F-16 fighter jets and acquiring more air defense ammunition to protect Ukrainian cities.
Is any form of assistance completely off the table? US and NATO countries are unlikely to agree to any moves that could lead to direct combat between Russian and NATO forces, but even here, the lines are
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