OPINION: Invitation to Capitulate. Is Putin Really Ready for Negotiations?

In the lead-up to the Peace Summit for Ukraine in Switzerland, it's crucial to recognize that real peace requires vigilance against Moscow’s tactics.

“The ‘war party’ rules in Kyiv, and it seeks, at least in words, to defeat Russia ‘on the battlefield.’ Under such conditions, it is difficult to imagine a peace dialogue,” stated Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on May 30.

Accusations from Moscow about Ukraine’s reluctance to initiate a peace process are becoming more frequent, as are claims of Russia’s readiness for negotiations.

Clearly, Russia aims to weaken Kyiv’s stance at the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15-16.

Moscow also has a more ambitious goal. At the start of the full-scale invasion, Putin failed to convince the world that a quick surrender of Ukraine was the best solution for everyone. Now, Russia is trying to promote the same idea under the guise of “peacekeeping.”

Imitation of Goodwill

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine began with harsh and uncompromising rhetoric from the Kremlin. However, by September-October 2022, Moscow began talking about its readiness for peace. The reason was simple: Putin’s “blitzkrieg” had failed, and Russia had lost the strategic initiative. Russian troops were expelled from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions, then from the Kharkiv region and the right bank of the Kherson region, and plans to land in Odesa sank along with the cruiser Moskva.

To prevent further collapse of the occupying army, the Kremlin announced a partial mobilization and resorted to using thousands of Russian prison inmates in “meat assaults.” Despite these failures, there was no indication of Putin’s real intentions to stop the war. His generals needed an operational pause to prepare mobilized recruits and replenish weapon reserves depleted after the initial months of the war.

The occupation administrations in captured Ukrainian territories also needed time to consolidate power and suppress active resistance. Additionally, the Kremlin was alarmed by the West's consolidation, which began providing effective support to Ukraine. In such a situation, starting negotiations with Kyiv would give Moscow time to undermine the West’s determination to support Ukraine.

These calculations were well understood in Kyiv and Western capitals. The Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, despite Kyiv's efforts, did not lead to lasting peace.

In the early days of the full-scale war, President Zelensky repeatedly appealed to Putin to meet at the negotiating table. But until Russia faced problems at the front, the Kremlin scornfully dismissed these appeals. Even during negotiations between Ukrainian and Russian delegations in March 2022 in Belarus and Turkey, Russia put forward clearly unacceptable demands from a position of strength, which would have been humiliating and suicidal for Ukraine.

In the fall of 2022, the Kremlin spoke about negotiations only “on its terms,” without specifying them. It was obvious that Kyiv was not going to capitulate or give the occupiers time to recover.

Repeating Lies

Throughout 2023, Putin revisited the topic of negotiations, and this year, assurances of readiness for dialogue have become a constant refrain in the Kremlin’s rhetoric. But has the context of these statements changed?

Russia still needs an operational pause, especially after the US military aid package for Ukraine and increased EU assistance. Moscow is particularly concerned about Ukraine receiving F-16 aircraft and permits for using long-range missiles on Russian territory. If Ukraine could inflict significant strikes on deep Russian targets with its means, what could it achieve with more advanced weapons?

Ukraine is also carrying out increased mobilization to re-staff existing units and create new combat units. The cumulative effect of these measures could significantly complicate the occupying army’s situation and potentially force Putin into another wave of mobilization, which is highly unpopular in Russian society.

Starting negotiations on the Kremlin’s terms would also raise doubts about the feasibility of further Western support for Ukraine. Why support Kyiv if it is ready to capitulate?

The word “capitulation” is not an exaggeration. The Kremlin still hasn’t outlined its negotiating position, hoping Kyiv will accept all Moscow’s ultimatums. Putin indirectly confirmed this on May 28, saying Russia is ready to resume negotiations based on the Istanbul results, which was an invitation for Ukraine to capitulate. Lavrov’s statement on May 30 reinforces this: “Russia is open to peace negotiations, not a truce. There is a theoretical possibility to speed up the settlement: in case of the cessation of the Western weapons supply and the cessation of hostilities by Kyiv.”

These conditions are far from reasonable. We've seen the consequences of delays in approving aid for Ukraine in the US Congress. Without Western weapons, Ukraine's ability to resist effectively would diminish, leading not to peace but to more victims, destruction, and expanded occupation.

Hostilities can only cease bilaterally, and the aggressor must make the first move. This is common sense, not just principle.

Substitution of Priorities

Promoting the Kremlin’s idea of readiness for negotiations serves a tactical and strategic purpose. Strategically, it aims to confuse Western societies, shifting the focus from military aid for Ukraine to starting a peace process that Moscow is allegedly open to. To create this illusion, Russia uses all means to influence Western public and establishment opinions.

Portraying the victim as the aggressor is one of Russia’s favorite propaganda techniques. The Kremlin used this method before the full-scale invasion, spreading lies about Ukraine’s aggressive plans. Now, Russia wants to present Ukraine’s leadership as a “party of war” rejecting generous peace offers from the Kremlin.

The war of attrition tests both Ukrainian society and Kyiv’s Western partners. The worst response now would be to believe in Putin’s goodwill and see the Kremlin’s statements as a chance to end the war.

Over the past decade, Russia has shown that its proposals do not lead to lasting peace. The only way to end the war is to force Russia to agree to a peace settlement developed in Kyiv, with international consensus. For this to happen, Russia must recognize its inability to force Ukraine to meet its ultimatums. Solidarity with Kyiv at the Global Peace Summit and increased military support for Ukraine are crucial.