On May 6, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the authorization of a military exercise involving the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in southern Russia, claiming it was a routine training activity.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first such announcement since the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Additionally, this exercise included transferring some tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, marking the first such movement of warheads outside Russia since the USSR's fall.
Moscow justified this deployment by citing perceived military threats from France, Britain, and the United States. However, the Pentagon reported no changes to the alert status of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, despite Moscow’s alarming rhetoric.
Russia contends that France's troop deployment to Ukraine and Britain's provision of strike weapons to Kyiv encourage actions that could reach into Russia. Furthermore, Washington is supplying Ukraine with additional Patriot batteries and long-range strike weapons.
Putin’s frequent nuclear threats are causing significant concern in Washington. His recent exercise in southern Russia is clearly aimed at Ukraine, coinciding with a prolonged military stalemate. Last week, Putin dismissed his long-serving defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, replacing him with an economic bureaucrat focused on integrating military manufacturing into the economy. Power is increasingly concentrated in Putin's hands, making him the longest-serving Russian leader since Stalin.
Before Russia’s March presidential election, Putin declared he would use nuclear missiles if Russia’s state, sovereignty, or independence were threatened. Boasting about Russia's nuclear triad, he claimed it was superior to the United States'—a patently false assertion. When asked about the potential for a nuclear confrontation over Ukraine, he stated that while he had not yet seen the need, Russia was ready. He emphasized, "Ukraine is a matter of life and death for us."
Russia’s nuclear doctrine outlines four scenarios for nuclear weapon use: an attack with nuclear missiles, perceived imminent nuclear missile launches, attacks aimed at crippling its nuclear forces, or threats to the existence of the Russian state, including via superior NATO conventional weapons.
Considering the potential pros and cons of Putin using tactical or strategic nuclear weapons, one scenario suggests Russia might deploy tactical nuclear weapons to avoid battlefield defeat in Ukraine, calculating that the U.S. would not retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons over non-strategic uses. This could pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to end the conflict prematurely.
Tactical nuclear missiles have smaller warheads compared to strategic ones, with Moscow possessing around 1,900 such missiles. Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, tactical ones cannot devastate entire cities.
Western perspectives on this issue vary widely. Lawrence Freedman, a prominent British military historian, argues that using tactical nuclear weapons would be pointless for Russia due to their limited military effect, though he acknowledges the potential for poor decisions from Moscow.
Freedman notes that the former Soviet Union had a cautious collective leadership, contrasting it with today’s personalized dictatorship under Putin. The quality of information reaching Putin and whether he faces any internal challenges are unknown.
Freedman was asked about U.S. intelligence chief Avril Haines' view that Putin might use nuclear weapons if he feels threatened. He responded that it is uncertain, but if Ukraine were to threaten Moscow directly, nuclear weapons might be used.
I disagree with Freedman that Russia’s defeat in Ukraine would not threaten the Russian state's survival, as some of Putin’s advisers propose using nuclear weapons. Sergei Karaganov, an adviser to the Kremlin, recently argued for potential nuclear strikes on Europe, though his influence is debatable.
Graham Allison, a Harvard professor, highlights Russia's enduring status as a nuclear superpower and the significant threat of catastrophic consequences if Russia uses nuclear weapons. The U.S. has reduced its tactical nuclear arsenal, while Russia has integrated them into its defense strategy.
Allison points out the uncomfortable parallel between Putin’s nuclear threats over newly annexed territories and U.S. Cold War policies. He asserts that Biden’s administration is right to take Putin’s threats seriously.
Wall Street Journal writer Walter Russell Mead notes that Putin frames the Ukraine conflict as a struggle for Russia’s survival, raising the specter of a nuclear strike. He emphasizes the importance of understanding Putin’s perspective to gauge the seriousness of his threats and develop appropriate responses.
Mead argues that nuclear threats serve Putin’s goals in Ukraine and his broader campaign against the U.S.-led order. Yielding to such threats would harm U.S. credibility and power, though deterring a Russian attack risks escalating U.S. involvement.
Columbia University professor Richard Betts warns of the imperative to plan for potential Russian nuclear weapon use, especially if Ukraine gains a decisive advantage. He outlines three possible U.S. responses to a Russian nuclear attack: inaction, nuclear retaliation, or large-scale conventional warfare, noting that each option carries significant risks.
Betts concludes that conventional warfare is the least bad option, as direct combat between major powers risks escalation to mass destruction. He also notes that a Russian nuclear attack could deter NATO from engaging directly, potentially encouraging further Russian nuclear use.
For Australia, the use of nuclear weapons would have global implications, despite our lack of nuclear weapons and peripheral role in European conflicts. We must ensure that our U.S. allies clearly communicate to Putin that even tactical nuclear weapon use could risk total war and the end of Russia as a functioning state.
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